It’s Not Too Late to Give Gaza a Better Future

Four months after the October 7 massacre by Hamas, Israel says it is continuing to pursue the total defeat of the Islamist group, which has ruled the Gaza Strip for 17 years. At the same time, Israel is reportedly negotiating a hostage deal built around a pause in the fighting that could extend for months—long enough to make the resumption of full-scale operations unlikely, and perhaps even to arrive at a negotiated settlement.

The medium-term survival of Hamas politically and administratively now appears inevitable. If so, what has been the point of the Israeli military operation in Gaza? The conflict has, according to the Hamas-run Health Ministry, claimed the lives of 27,365 Gazans and left an estimated 8,000 missing. (Israel counts some 10,000 Hamas militants among the dead.) It has produced unspeakable human suffering, including a fast-approaching famine, and rendered much of the coastal enclave uninhabitable, while setting the Middle East aflame. If Israel was inevitably going to negotiate with Hamas for the release of the remaining hostages and then pull out its troops, only for the group to move back in, why hasn’t the Israeli government articulated any reasonable and realistic plans for what becomes of Gaza after the war?

Hamas has proved resilient, even in the face of the Israel Defense Forces’ overwhelming firepower. The Israeli military claims to have destroyed 75 percent of Hamas’s organized battalions and to have killed thousands of fighters. However, the elaborate web of tunnels under the Strip has enabled many Hamas fighters, security personnel, government employees, and leaders to sit out the Israeli onslaught. There is widespread doubt among U.S. and even Israeli security officials that the war will eliminate Hamas as a military force, entirely destroy its arsenals, or even prevent it from continuing to govern.

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If the Israeli government chooses to keep troops inside Gaza, the IDF will likely face a sustained and costly insurgency. Some analysts believe that Hamas is ditching centralized command and control and has instructed its remaining fighters to operate as small, independent cells. Those fighters may be able to draw on weapons caches throughout the Strip.

As the IDF has withdrawn troops from sections of the Gaza Strip, Hamas militants and security personnel have reemerged in some areas. The group is attempting to reassert its presence both to send a message to Gazans and to prepare for future ambushes and confrontations with the IDF. One recent video appears to show ununiformed Hamas police officers arresting dozens of alleged thieves in Gaza City and parading them half-naked through the streets, while forcing them to recite their offenses. Hamas has also redeployed some civil servants and officers near Shifa Hospital, which has now been vacated by IDF troops.

Some Gazans have attempted to create local protection committees to defend their neighborhoods from lawlessness and looting, according to multiple people I’ve been in touch with in Gaza. However, Hamas has refused to allow such committees. The group claims to be concerned about infiltration by plainclothes IDF soldiers, but in reality, Hamas is ensuring that no parallel or alternative security mechanism, no matter how modest, can emerge to challenge its hegemonic control.

And Hamas may believe that it’s on the cusp of catching a desperately needed break. According to some reports, the current cease-fire proposals call for pauses in fighting that last anywhere from six weeks to four months. The phased implementation of hostage releases is likely to be dragged out by Hamas, which is demanding not a pause, but a permanent cessation of hostilities and the end of IDF operations inside Gaza. The Islamist group views the Israeli hostages as its last and chief bargaining chip, without which the Israeli government would have no incentive to stop the war. Hamas is also betting that U.S. pressure would prevent Israel from relaunching the war after a long pause, both because American officials have expressed doubt about Israel’s ability to defeat the group militarily and because of U.S. political considerations.

As I speak with people on the ground in Gaza, I’ve noticed that people are already pulling back on overt criticism and condemnation of the Islamist group, because they see what’s coming. Hamas appears certain to stay, and it will retaliate against any opposition to its repressive rule. Professionals who are involved in planning day-after scenarios for Gaza have started discussing “postwar plans” instead of “post-Hamas plans,” signaling a shift in expectations.

If a cessation in the fighting is indeed imminent, then time has almost run out to deliver to Gazans a better future. As soon as a cease-fire begins, what’s left of Hamas’s fighters and personnel will emerge from the tunnels, put back on their military uniforms, and resume operations out in the open, especially in areas vacated by IDF ground units. But that isn’t the only alternative.

If the international community doesn’t want to see Hamas return to power in Gaza, it must act immediately. First, it must establish a small, professional, and apolitical police force—staffed with officers selected by the Palestinian Authority, and overseen by monitors from Arab nations and the international community. As the Israeli military withdraws from an area, this force can assume control there, preventing lawlessness and chaos, securing humanitarian and relief efforts, and allowing for the return of civilians to what remains of their neighborhoods. It can also help secure a naval corridor to bring in aid ships, and protect airdrop zones for food and crucial supplies.

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Importantly, this police force should not be tasked with counterterrorism or with conducting anti-Hamas operations; it should not be asked to act as a security subcontractor on behalf of Israel. After all, if the Israeli military, with all of its capabilities, has not been able to eradicate Hamas, a small, lightly armed police force will not be able to achieve that goal. And no Palestinian wants to be put in a position where they have to do messy and complicated counterterrorism and counterinsurgency work that Israel was unable to do itself. The uncertainty of what to do about Hamas’s remaining military capability can be addressed at a later phase. For now, the priority must be establishing a professional security presence that can enable the international community to work in Gaza and feel confident that aid and supplies are being delivered where they’re supposed to go.

The success of such a force will require Hamas’s tacit approval, and the current negotiations provide the only realistic opportunity to secure it. Hamas is weak right now, but it will be emboldened during a cease-fire, when its members will be shielded from Israeli attacks and it will begin to reemerge and reconstitute itself across the Strip. Israeli and international policy makers are concerned about the group using a cease-fire to prepare for renewed conflict, but they should be equally concerned about Hamas attempting to reassert its administrative role by deploying security personnel across the enclave.

Building a better future for Gazans is in the interest of the United States, and will require its leadership. The Office of the U.S. Security Coordinator for Israel and the Palestinian Authority in Jerusalem has the experience to help make this security force a reality. The USSC, overseen by a three-star general, has helped create training courses, operational protocols, vetting procedures, and other processes for the Palestinian Authority’s police and security forces. The State Department can help finance the establishment of such a professional security force in cooperation with key partners such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, and Egypt, all of whom have previously helped finance and equip Palestinian security forces.

And the U.S. must also exercise assertive leadership to overcome the Israeli government’s unwillingness to present realistic and actionable day-after plans. Beyond permanent reoccupation or ill-conceived ideas like turning control of Gaza over to local tribes, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has failed to provide any viable path forward. The Netanyahu government, however, can be pressured into approving the establishment of this security force, despite its hostility toward Palestinian autonomy, because this proposal offers the best hope of preventing Hamas from retaking complete control of Gaza. To minimize friction, the proposed force, instead of being directly controlled by the Palestinian Authority, should be provisionally placed under the control of other entities or countries, such as the United Nations, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.

Gaza’s future, after the most horrific and destructive war in its history, must not be undermined by poor planning, intransigence, and lack of imagination. That Hamas is already reemerging in parts of Gaza vacated by IDF ground troops should serve as a warning of what will happen throughout the Strip, unless some alternative course is immediately pursued.

After months of horrendous slaughter, destruction, and suffering, the people of Gaza desperately need a new future. I’ve lost at least 31 family members in the war, and both of my childhood homes have been demolished by Israeli bombs. I am desperate to ensure that these losses were not in vain. With some courage, creativity, and assertive planning, we can still create a better future for Palestinians and Israelis alike.